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CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY INITIATIVE PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING

CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY INITIATIVE

PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING

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ACRONYMS

CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBSI	Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CTIP	Countering Trafficking in Persons
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex
NSS	National Security Strategy
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this Plan for Implementation and Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (Implementation and MEL Plan) is to bring a more evidence-based, results-oriented focus to USAID's CBSI programming. The field of citizen security has evolved significantly since CBSI launched in 2009. In addition, the Implementation and MEL Plan is USAID's response to the findings of Congress' Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2018 CBSI audit, which¹ included a formal recommendation to the State Department to strengthen monitoring and reporting on the results of CBSI programming.

This Implementation and MEL Plan incorporates a decade of learning regarding what is most effective in CBSI programming. Under this plan, USAID's CBSI programs will focus on impacting:

1. Communities where crime and violence are high;
2. Demographic groups that are most at-risk for involvement in crime and violence; and
3. Institutions critical to providing effective crime and violence prevention.

This strategic approach depends on reliable geographic data on crime and violence², tools that allow us to assess individual youths' risk levels³ to allow more targeted programming, and careful assessments of the capacity and needs of crime and violence prevention institutions. Using this Implementation and MEL Plan, each Mission will first identify what types of crime and violence are most critical to address (i.e., homicides, gender-based violence/domestic violence, robbery/burglary), drawing on host-country context, the Mission's comparative advantage, and host-country priorities; and then design youth violence prevention programming targeted at addressing that particular violence problem. This evidence-based approach will allow USAID to achieve a more measurable impact.

This Implementation and MEL Plan will guide future USAID CBSI programming. It provides the strategic logic around which future USAID programming should be designed, reported on, and measured. The Implementation and MEL Plan includes a results framework with indicators against which each Mission will need to report. As such, this plan will inform the development of future CBSI programming under Country/Regional Development Cooperation Strategies (R/CDCS) for those Missions implementing CBSI programs: the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and the Eastern and Southern Caribbean, and may be a useful tool as USAID considers how to address growing violence in Haiti.

¹ United States Government Accountability Office, [*SECURITY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Should Establish a Mechanism to Assess Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Progress*](#), (2019).

² The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime states that homicide rates above 10 per 100,000 are considered to have reached epidemic levels. Currently, the Caribbean region has a homicide average of 16 per 100,000 vs. a global average of 6.2. Countries like Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago reported rates of 47 and 37 per 100,000 for 2018, putting them in the top 5 for the world. (UNODC, 2014).

³ Singh, Jay P. et al, *International Perspectives on the Practical Application of Violence Risk Assessment: A Global Survey of 44 Countries*, (International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 2014)

INTRODUCTION

CBSI was launched after the 5th Summit of the Americas in April 2009 in response to rising crime (high homicide rates)⁴; the security threat posed by Transnational Organized Crime; and the need to secure the U.S.' third border.⁵ Now, almost ten years later, regional average homicide rates are nearly halved, yet homicide rates remain high and above epidemic levels. Currently, eight independent Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member countries figure in the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)'s top 20 countries for homicides.⁶ CARICOM estimates that gang-related crime costs up to four percent of Gross Domestic Product.⁷ Other forms of crime and violence, including drug trafficking, assault, robbery, and domestic violence, profoundly affect communities. Generally, crime and violence hinder economic and human development in the region and remain a key priority as USAID looks to expedite partner countries' self-reliance and sustainable development.

CBSI brings members of CARICOM and the Dominican Republic together to collaborate on regional security with the United States as a partner. The United States and Caribbean countries have identified three core objectives to address the threats facing the Caribbean:

- **Reduce Illicit Trafficking:** This objective includes counternarcotics and reducing the flow of illegal arms and light weapons. The State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs leads this objective area for the United States.
- **Increase Safety and Security:** This objective aims to professionalize law enforcement and improve the rule of law by supporting the development of the justice sector. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) leads this objective area for the United States and coordinates with USAID.
- **Prevent Youth Crime and Violence:** This objective focuses on crime and violence prevention activities in targeted communities, police and justice sector reform, anti-corruption programs, addressing gender-based violence, and increased educational, economic and social opportunities for at-risk youth. USAID leads this objective area for the United States.

USAID's CBSI efforts will improve the safety and security of the region, which is a top regional priority and a pressing need for our Caribbean partners. USAID's CBSI programming also supports critical national security priorities including the President's E.O. 13773 on "Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking" and the 2018 National Security Strategy Pillar 1: "Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life." To address these priorities, USAID programming targets the drivers of youth crime and violence to reduce the risk of youth involvement as well as improving governmental and civil society ability to effectively prevent crime and violence.

USAID's CBSI programming mainly focuses on youth, as they are the primary victims and perpetrators of crime in the Caribbean.⁸ In 2014 and 2016, the Americas Barometer indicated

⁴ Dalby, Chris and Carranza, Camilo, *InSight Crime's 2018 Homicide Round-Up*, (Insight Crime, 2019).

⁵ U.S. Department of State, [U.S. Strategy For Engagement in the Caribbean](#), (n.d.).

⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Victims of intentional homicide, 1990-2018, (n.d.).

⁷ United Nations News, [Criminal violence taking rising toll in Caribbean countries, UN report finds](#), (2012).

⁸ USAID, [USAID Crime and Violence Prevention Field Guide](#), (2016), 17-19.

that crime and violence remains the number one concern among adolescents and youth in the region.⁹¹⁰ According to the 2012 United Nations Caribbean Human Development Report, victims of violent crime are mainly low-income 18- to 30-year-olds and 80 percent of prosecuted crimes were committed by people aged 17 to 29.¹¹ The impact of youth violence extends beyond youth and affects perpetrators' and victims' families, friends, and communities. Therefore, interventions will not focus on individual youth in isolation of other factors related to violence.¹²

USAID's overall goal under CBSI is preventing youth crime and violence, narrowing the focus from the original goal of promoting social justice. USAID's CBSI programming will do this through a dual approach, supporting activities to:

1. Advance community-level youth crime and violence prevention interventions, including a positive youth development approach focused on youth engagement for civic and economic opportunity.
2. Strengthen the ability of governments and civil society to effectively prevent crime and violence.

CBSI has been codified under the Caribbean-United States Framework for Security Cooperation, the Caribbean-United States Declaration of Principles, and the Caribbean-United States Plan of Action. When the Framework was updated in November 2017, it emphasized that improving citizen security requires a coordinated, multi-national and multi-sector approach including prevention, institutional reforms, and information sharing. When the Plan of Action was also updated in November 2017, the governments committed to implementing and strengthening the collection and use of reliable data as a basis for policies and decision-making.

The purpose of this Implementation and MEL Plan is to bring a more results-oriented focus to USAID's CBSI programming. Violence prevention understanding and practice has evolved significantly since CBSI was launched in 2009. This new Implementation and MEL Plan re-frames USAID's CBSI programming to reflect what has been learned. In addition, the Implementation and MEL Plan is USAID's response to the findings of Congress' Government Accountability Office 2018 CBSI audit that included a formal recommendation for the State Department to strengthen monitoring and reporting on the results of CBSI programming.

This plan is also intended to guide future USAID CBSI programming. It provides the strategic logic around which future USAID programming should be designed, reported on, and measured. Additionally, it includes a results framework with indicators against which each Mission will report.

STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT

CBSI was launched in response to rising crime and violence and its connection to Transnational

⁹ LAPOP Americas Barometer, [Citizen Security in Six Countries in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States: Results from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer](#), (2016). Note: Last study conducted was in 2016/2017 with the exception of Suriname and Barbados, last conducted in 2014.

¹⁰ LAPOP Americas Barometer, [Security, Democracy, and Liberty in the Caribbean: A Report on Findings from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer](#), (2017)

¹¹ United Nations Development Programme, Caribbean Human Development Report 2012, (Washington D.C., 2013), 34.

¹² USAID, [USAID Crime and Violence Prevention Field Guide](#), (2016), 7.

Organized Crime in the region. CBSI supports the President's E.O. 13773 on "Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking" by combating drug and human trafficking, smuggling of people and illicit goods, and transnational gangs and criminal organizations before they reach the United States.¹³

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

National Security Strategy (NSS): CBSI supports the 2018 National Security Strategy Pillar 1: "Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life." This includes aiding efforts to thwart transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) by: addressing the risk factors that lead youth to become involved in crime so that fewer youth become involved in TCOs; and improving the transparency and effectiveness of key rule of law institutions in order to reduce the operating space for TCOs. In targeting youth violence prevention, USAID's CBSI programming also responds to the NSS component of "Empowering Women and Young People." The NSS and other strategic documents illustrate the threat that competing powers pose to the international order, democratic norms, and the U.S. economy. The development approach outlined in this Implementation and MEL Plan contrasts with that of competing powers, which focus primarily on large loans for infrastructure and energy projects, and offers a clear choice to our partner countries on who can help make their communities safer.

Joint Strategic Plan: USAID's CBSI programming aligns with the State Department/USAID 2018 Joint Strategic Plan Strategy Goal 1: Protect America's Security at Home and Abroad, supporting strategic objective 1.3 "Counter instability, transnational crime, and violence that threaten U.S. interests by strengthening citizen-responsive governance, security, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law." Specifically, USAID's CBSI programming targets Performance Goal 1.3.3: "By 2022, work with partner governments to strengthen criminal justice systems and support prevention efforts in local communities in order to build capacity to address transnational organized crime."¹⁴ USAID also supports Performance Goal 2.3.2, "Through 2022, prevent and combat corruption and its role in criminal activity by strengthening other countries' capacity to address it through increased anti-corruption training and anti-corruptions measures."¹⁵

Joint Regional Strategy: USAID's approach to CBSI most closely aligns with Goal 1, "A Secure Hemisphere," of the 2018 Joint Regional Strategy for Western Hemisphere, supporting objective 1.1, "Counter Transnational Crime Organizations and illicit networks." CBSI addresses sub-objective 1.1.2: "Reduce the influence of organized crime and gangs in Central America, Mexico, Colombia, and the Caribbean." At the same time, USAID's targeting of critical institutional capacity needs provides cross-cutting support for Goal 3, "A Democratic Hemisphere," supporting objective 3.2, "Strengthen rule of law and judicial systems," 3.3, "Strengthen rule of law and judicial systems," and objective 3.4, "Deepen respect for human rights and spur participation of vulnerable populations."

U.S. Strategy for Engagement in the Caribbean: The CBSI Implementation and MEL Plan supports the Caribbean 2020 Strategy focus on security¹⁶ and the need to reduce levels of crime and violence, curb the trafficking of illicit drugs, strengthen the rule of law, and improve citizen

¹³ White House, [Executive Order 13773](#), (Washington D.C., 2017).

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State. [Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018-2022](#), (Washington, D.C., 2018), 29.

¹⁵ Ibid, 43.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, [U.S. Strategy For Engagement in the Caribbean](#), (n.d.).

security in the Caribbean region. USAID's CBSI programming supports communities, social service providers, and government agencies in implementing successful approaches to prevent crime and violence, increase opportunities and skills for highly vulnerable youth, improve trust and cooperation between law enforcement and communities, strengthen the juvenile justice sector, and reduce public and private sector corruption. These activities will support Caribbean governments in efforts to stem the crime and violence, including that associated with transnational criminal organizations that threaten the United States and the Caribbean.

Countering Malign Influence: This Implementation and MEL Plan supports USAID's goal of countering malign influence in foreign assistance by working in close collaboration with partner governments and civil society to design impactful approaches that will have a long-term effect on reducing crime and violence in the region. USAID's collaborative, evidence-based approach builds government and civil society support for U.S. Foreign Assistance, helping to establish or maintain the U.S. government as the development partner of choice. Our partners in the Caribbean are fully aware of the significant impact of crime and violence in reducing economic growth and appreciate those donor programs, like CBSI, that address these underlying conditions that impede development over the long term. Efforts under CBSI to build partner country capacity, transparency, and effectiveness reduce opportunities for malign actors to gain influence over partner country governments through corrupt means. USAID will identify how malign influence may be gaining hold in partner countries and across the Caribbean and account for this in program design. USAID's Office of Caribbean Affairs in the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, in coordination with USAID's Caribbean Missions, will work with USAID and Department of State stakeholders to design and conduct effective messaging about CBSI's successes.

Science, Technology, and Innovation: USAID is changing the landscape of development by investing in innovation and harnessing the power of science & technology to push the envelope of what is possible. Under this Implementation and MEL Plan, USAID will work with governmental and non-governmental partners, including the private sector, to identify innovative approaches to preventing youth crime and violence. USAID will also incorporate the use of science and technology in assessment; program design; and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL). LAC/CAR will connect Caribbean missions to other missions working on crime and violence prevention in order to strengthen the community of practice and emphasize the importance of science, technology, and innovation in assessment, design, and MEL, using guidance from USAID's Digital Strategy.¹⁷

Human Rights and Vulnerable Populations: Citizen security programming must include vulnerable populations, which are at high risk of becoming victims and/or perpetrators of violence, including violence at the hands of the state. Consistent with this focus, USAID has issued policy documents detailing our commitment to inclusive development including, but not limited to, the Disability Policy; the Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy; the Youth in Development Policy; the Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Strategy; LGBT Vision for Action; and the Nondiscrimination for Beneficiaries Policy.

¹⁷ USAID. *Digital Strategy 2020-2024*, (Washington, D.C., 2020).

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-RELIANCE

Most of USAID's CBSI host-country partners are middle-income countries that are close to achieving self-reliance. Rising crime and violence and the connection to transnational organized crime increase Caribbean countries' vulnerability to crisis and instability, which threatens their development progress. Of the metrics available, safety and security and government effectiveness have lower capacity scores for several Caribbean countries.

To address this, USAID partners with host countries in the region to develop long-term, sustainable solutions to this growing crime and violence challenge. In drawing on self-reliance principles of country capacity and commitment, USAID is building on what has been learned to date to more narrowly focus programming on areas prone to violence, including locations where high violent crime rates exist, and where the most at-risk populations reside, utilizing prevention as the most cost-effective strategy. To achieve this USAID is working with host country partners to identify locations, population groups, and specific crime and violence challenges to target as well as building the capacity, transparency, and effectiveness of key citizen security institutions.

USAID will catalyze partnerships between host governments, communities, and the private sector to promote focused, evidence-based solutions that build resilience to the threat of crime and violence while fostering commitment to see these new solutions through effectively, inclusively, and with accountability. These solutions may come from government, private sector, civil society, or citizens themselves. CBSI also builds the capacity and commitment of young people and emerging leaders to advance their own self-reliance while supporting human capital investments in youth that reduce drivers of violence. The above will be supported by systematic and strategic efforts to transfer knowledge and skills in order to transition, integrate, and mainstream approaches as USAID's development assistance declines and ultimately ends.

Regarding private sector engagement, the private and public sectors spend a significant amount of resources on security. In implementing CBSI programs, USAID will stimulate and build on the interest of the private sector partners to improve economic opportunity for entry-level young employees, reduce risk and crime in their areas of operation, and make the private sector an active partner in USAID's CBSI programming.

TECHNICAL LINKS TO SIMILAR PROGRAMMING

Technical Links within USAID: LAC/CAR will continue to build a LAC-wide community of knowledge and practice along with the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Merida Initiative in Mexico, which also focus on preventing crime and violence in the region. In the process, USAID will raise the profile of the Agency's violence prevention work globally and position CBSI as a learning champion in this emerging field of practice. These violence reduction strategies will support other USAID priorities such as Children in Adversity, GBV prevention, Positive Youth Development and Engagement, C-TIP, human rights protection, education in conflict, and socio-emotional learning.

Technical Links within the USG: USAID actively cooperates with the State Department's efforts under objective 1, "Reduce Illicit Trafficking," led by the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and under objective 2, "Increase Safety and Security," led by the State

Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Through interagency and cross-mission coordination, USAID makes demonstrable efforts to share information and plan complementary strategies and programs.

LESSONS LEARNED

Historically, USAID's CBSI programming followed a two-prong approach. The first prong included broadly defined groups of at-risk youth across each country, focusing efforts on getting youth back to school, helping youth to build skills necessary to find employment, start a business, strengthen family ties as well as supporting juvenile justice reform. USAID focused resources on a mixture of community-level and child justice-level prevention approaches while piloting some more focused programming at a subset of higher-risk youth in target communities. The second prong tackled governance and rule of law issues such as reducing corruption and strengthening the rule of law, recognizing that weaknesses in these areas could facilitate increased crime and violence.

While CBSI programming enabled youth to find work or return to school, raised awareness of corruption, and strengthened the rule of law, it was difficult to clearly demonstrate how these combined efforts prevented or reduced youth crime and violence in the Caribbean. USAID's 2016 CBSI assessment,¹⁸ the 2018 GAO CBSI audit,¹⁹ various queries from Congress, and other key stakeholders cited the need for more targeted MEL to demonstrate the effectiveness of USAID's CBSI activities. This Implementation and MEL Plan builds upon the following lessons learned from USAID's citizen security programming to date.

Different types of violence require distinct programmatic approaches. All citizen security programming should begin with an assessment of the type or types of violence affecting the country. Violence can vary in its lethality or capacity to cause serious physical injury. It can occur in different settings, either public or private. The number of individuals involved may be few, or many, as with conflicts among gangs. It may be spontaneous or planned. It may be expressive of an emotion or instrumental in pursuit of illegal economic activity. Finally, it may be as frequent as domestic violence or as infrequent as warfare.²⁰

Effective programs target youth. Youth are both the main perpetrators and victims of violence.²¹ Preventing youth's early exposure to violence can be one of the most cost-effective approaches to preventing future crime and violence.²² Evidence shows that youth bear a disproportionate share of the costs of crime and violence; this exposure has important repercussions for their life and for society as a whole.²³ USAID defines youth as people in the age range of 10-29.

¹⁸ USAID, [Assessment of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative](#), (Social Impact, Washington, D.C., 2016).

¹⁹ United States Government Accountability Office, [SECURITY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Should Establish a Mechanism to Assess Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Progress](#), (2019).

²⁰ Bott, Sarah et al., *Violence against Women in Latin American and the Caribbean: A Comparative Analysis of Population-Based Data from 12 Countries*, (Pan American Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Washington, D.C., 2012), 20.

²¹ USAID. [USAID Crime and Violence Prevention Field Guide](#), (2016), 17-19.

²² Inter-American Development Bank. [The Costs of Crime and Violence – New Evidence and Insights in LAC](#), (Washington, D.C. 2017), 79.

²³ Ibid, 63.

Interventions should identify and treat high-risk places and people. Research demonstrates that crime and violence are concentrated in a small number of high-risk places, at high-risk times, and are generated by a small number of high-risk individuals.²⁴ The public health methodology is an effective approach to targeting these high-risk locations and individuals. The public health model uses the socio-ecological model, which analyzes a variety of interrelated risk factors at the individual, relationship, community, and societal levels. Risk factors influence the likelihood that individuals and communities will be involved with crime and/or violence, and it is the presence of multiple risk factors, especially when those risk factors fall across multiple levels, that is most associated with crime and violence.²⁵ An analysis of existing risk factors can help program managers target and prioritize those individuals and communities that are most at risk of crime and violence.

A holistic approach aimed at positive youth development is critical for risk reduction along with community and family needs. Youth crime and violence prevention programs are most effective when they also address needs at the family and community levels. Crime and violence are an expression of deep-rooted social and economic problems such as social inequality, unemployment, lack of opportunities, family dysfunction, substance abuse, and other societal factors.²⁶ Prevention programs require a multidisciplinary approach, including the “positive youth development” methodology that actively engages a wide variety of actors beyond law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Interventions depend on the nature of the crime and violence affecting the particular community, the particular drivers of violence and crime, and the demographics of the at-risk population.

Youth violence is driven by multiple factors. These factors range from individual psychological characteristics to broader social and environmental conditions. Workforce development and entrepreneurship programs on their own are not sufficient to prevent youth crime and violence. Instead, these types of programs are but one piece in the puzzle of a holistic program aimed at building youth resilience and reducing risk factors driving youth involvement in crime and violence.²⁷ Crime and violence prevention efforts therefore require a multidisciplinary approach that actively engages a wide variety of actors and agencies beyond law enforcement and the criminal justice system.

Prevention is the most cost-effective approach to reducing crime and violence. Compared to repression and remediation, prevention is the most cost-effective way to reduce crime and violence. Prevention interventions break the cycle of violence. For this reason, “the focus should be on preventing violence before it occurs whenever possible, either through deterrence or prevention. Active engagement with high-risk populations is critical. Reacting after the fact is necessary but not sufficient.”²⁸ Trauma from being exposed to violence is a risk factor for criminal and violent behavior. Chronic violence tends to desensitize individuals to the effects and

²⁴ Anthony Braga, Andrew Papachristos, David Hureau, *Hot Spots Policing Effects on Crime* (The Campbell Collaboration, 2012). Note: There is still insufficient research about the concentration of crime levels in the LAC region. Although it is likely that criminal dynamics follow similar paths, the evidence thus far is still anecdotal.

²⁵ World Health Organization, *Social Ecological Model*, (2002).

²⁶ Caroline O.N. Moser, Cathy McIlwaine, *Latin American Urban Violence as a Development Concern: Towards a Framework for Violence Reduction*, (World Development, Volume 34, Issue 1, 2006), 89-112.

²⁷ Hamby, S., et al, *From Poly-Victimization to Poly-Strengths: Understanding the Web of Violence Can Transform Research on Youth Violence and Illuminate the Path to Prevention and Resilience*, (Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 2018), 719–739

²⁸ USAID, *What Works in Reducing Community Violence Final Report*, (Washington, D.C., 2016), 18-19.

consequences of violence.²⁹ Preventing crime not only avoids the suffering of personal and material losses, it is also more cost-effective than reacting to committed crimes.³⁰

Building program legitimacy is important. Interventions that create a positive feedback loop between formal (e.g., police) and informal social control (e.g., communities) are more likely to achieve lasting results and sustainability. Community interventions should engage communities directly, facilitating the community's active ownership of the problem. It is also important to address national and/or local level governance issues that are of equal importance as they can also affect ownership, and by extension strengthen the legitimacy of violence prevention efforts.³¹

USAID should carefully assess institutional capacity gaps. Governance and rule of law issues such as corruption and impunity hinder effective crime and violence prevention. Weak justice institutions also create spaces for high rates of impunity. Improving local ability to identify and address these issues including: (1) the large number of crimes being un/under-investigated; and/or (2) many criminals going unprosecuted can be just as important as community-level crime and violence prevention.³² At the same time, government corruption contributes to biased and compromised decision-making processes and high levels of public distrust in government officials and institutions. Transnational Organized Crime can drive increased levels of corruption. As a result, it is critical that USAID demonstrate how CBSI programming targeting corruption, rule of law institutions, local governance, civil society and/or related issues directly contributes to USAID's focus on youth crime and violence prevention, complementing efforts to prevent crime and violence at the community level.

Partnership is critical. Interventions do not exist in a vacuum. Donor and national coordination mechanisms are key to operationalizing these partnerships and advancing common development goals. Actively engaging and partnering with critical stakeholders is essential. Ineffective interventions are generally overbroad and reactive in their focus, lacking in legitimacy, improperly implemented, lacking a sound theory of change, and working in isolation or even in conflict with other organizations.³³

Child justice reform takes time. While institutions and individuals can easily adopt the language of reform, applying it consistently to ensure all levels of the child justice system model a rehabilitative approach is difficult. USAID's 2017 baseline data collection for its impact evaluation on juvenile justice reform in Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia demonstrated that despite five or more years of child justice reform programming, informants from child detention facilities across the three countries raised concerns around physical abuse of juveniles, poor facility conditions, and unmet mental health needs. These findings included indications of youth being

²⁹ Adams, Tani, [*Chronic Violence and its Reproduction: Perverse Trends in Social Relations, Citizenship, and Democracy in the Americas*](#), (Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 2012), 28. See also Adams' more recent work on the effects of traumatization resulting from experiencing violence in the home, *Chronic violence and non-conventional armed actors: a systemic approach*, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, 2014.

³⁰ Inter-American Development Bank, *Better Spending for Better Lives: How Latin America and the Caribbean Can Do More with Less*, (2018), 218

³¹ USAID, *What Works in Reducing Community Violence Final Report*, (Washington, D.C., 2016), 19.

³² Organization of American States, [*Preliminary Observations Concerning the Human Rights Situation in Honduras*](#), 2014

³³ [*Ibid*](#), 19.

excessively hit by staff and significant use of solitary confinement.³⁴ Rather than punitive measures, children may require extensive and repeated rounds of psycho-social intervention to address unmet mental health needs. Further, the use of diversion as an alternative to jail requires a receptive community and network of social services to support youth at every step in order to prevent recidivism and re-incarceration.

How a program is implemented matters. “Even the best interventions fail if they are not implemented effectively or lack sufficient resources.”³⁵ As we evaluate programs, we must consider whether we have a problem with the theory of change or an issue of quality in implementation. A sound theory of change is critical for both implementation and evaluation. It should be well-defined and well-understood by all those involved. As part of these efforts, it is critical to document what works, assessing the program’s organizational characteristics and training required to replicate the successful approach in other missions/sites. Putting an emphasis on systematizing knowledge gained during the implementation process will guide the replication of programs proven to treat specific problems. Taking these best practices into account will ensure better quality in the foundational theory and rationale behind program design.

Effective citizen security programs use a gender-sensitive approach. Effective crime and violence prevention initiatives apply a gender-sensitive lens to assessment, design, and MEL to understand how men and boys, women and girls, and gender and sexual minorities are affected differently by crime and violence. In the Caribbean, as with many regions, boys and young men make up the largest group of primary perpetrators and victims of violent crime, including homicide, while women and girls are more likely to be victims of “silent” crimes, such as inter-familial and gender-based violence. USAID CBSI programming should seek to identify the different types of risk factors that affect young men and young women and treat beneficiaries accordingly. For boys and young men, this includes a focus on issues such as substance abuse, self-control, anger management, and positive masculinity.

Gender-based violence is part of the citizen security ecosystem. Preventing gender-based and intra-family violence is critical for a comprehensive crime and violence prevention program. The impact of GBV prevention extends beyond protecting women and girls; it also affects youths’ likelihood to commit crimes and violence as they grow up, as youth exposed to violence in the home are more likely to commit crimes throughout their life.³⁶ Additionally, witnessing GBV from a young age socializes youth to believe aggression against girls and women is commonplace and acceptable. Youth is a critical time when values and norms around gender equality are forged.³⁷ Working with youth is a best bet for preventing and eradicating GBV. USAID’s youth crime and violence prevention work will continue to address GBV in its youth prevention and institutional capacity-building.

Effective citizen security programs are inclusive: Vulnerable populations, including LGBTI persons, migrants, ethnic and cultural minorities, and people with disabilities are among those most susceptible to becoming perpetrators and/or victims of crime and violence. Those designing

³⁴ Williams, Dianne et al. [Evaluation of Juvenile Justice Sector Reform Implementation in St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana, Baseline Report](#). (Social Impact, Washington, D.C., 2018), 26.

³⁵ Inter-American Development Bank 2018 Analysis “*Better Spending for Better Lives: How Latin America and the Caribbean Can Do More with Less*”.

³⁶ Bjarnegard, E., Brouneus, K., & Melander, E, *Violent Boyhoods, Masculine Honor Ideology, and Political Violence: Survey Findings From Thailand*, (Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 2019), 1-25.

³⁷ UN Women, [What we do: Ending violence against women: Focusing on prevention to stop the violence](#), (2019).

citizen security programs should identify these vulnerable populations and ensure that they are able to access services. This should intentionally include vulnerable populations in assessment, monitoring, and evaluation to ensure that their needs are met.

RESULTS FRAMEWORK

CBSI is a security initiative. Its focus is on Transnational Organized Crime specifically, and growing crime and violence in the region generally, as stated in the overarching goals. The first pillar is **Reduce Illicit Trafficking**, and the focus is on reducing the flow of illegal arms/light weapons. The second pillar is **Increase Safety and Security**, and the focus is on professionalizing law enforcement institutions and supporting the development of the justice sector. The third pillar, **Prevent Youth Crime and Violence**, captures all of USAIDs' CBSI programming within the overarching Results Framework.

HIGH-LEVEL GOALS

Overarching CBSI GOAL: A Secure Caribbean: Counter Transnational Criminal Organizations and Prevent Crime and Violence to Increase Security in the Caribbean

USAID CBSI GOAL (CBSI Pillar 3): Youth Crime and Violence Prevented throughout the Caribbean. As described earlier, USAID's focus is on violence prevention rather than reduction, as research demonstrates prevention holds the greater potential for impact and cost-effectiveness of interventions.³⁸ At the same time, USAID focuses on youth as preventing youth's early exposure to violence can be one of the most cost-effective approaches to preventing future crime and violence. Evidence shows that youth bear a disproportionate share of the costs of higher levels of crime and violence given their increased risk of either committing and/or falling victim to violence. USAID defines youth as people in the age range of 10-29, though in some country contexts the age range may be slightly different to conform with host-country's definitions.

In targeting youth, USAID uses the socio-ecological model. This model means that USAID does not confine its interventions to work only with youth. Instances of violence across age ranges, including gender-based violence and violence against vulnerable populations affect and impact youth in ways that remain and shape their actions moving forward. Therefore, programming must take a more holistic approach to be effective, engaging youth peers, caregivers (family members), and other community leaders that affect youth crime and violence.

USAID recognizes that governance and rule of law are necessary components of effective youth crime and violence prevention. Access to reliable data on crime and violence is critical to identifying the populations most in need of assistance and determining what types of interventions are most effective. High corruption siphons off resources needed to prevent crime and violence, erodes citizen trust in institutions including the police and the judiciary, and opens operating space for criminal actors. High levels of impunity and judicial ineffectiveness mean fewer incentives not to commit criminal and violent acts. Heavy-handed policing tactics and police ineffectiveness

³⁸ USAID, *What Works in Reducing Community Violence Final Report*, (Washington, D.C., 2016), 18-19.

leave citizens without a reliable resource to address crime in their communities, which sometimes opens space for malign actors to serve as de facto governance and rule of law institutions. Civil society organizations may lack the resources to successfully petition their local and national governments for policy reform and investment in crime and violence prevention. For this reason, USAID believes that the design of CBSI programming must include an assessment of the institutional capacity for crime and violence prevention. Like youth crime and violence prevention work at the community level, USAID's institutional capacity programming will take into account issues specific to youth, but may also target key citizen security and rule of law institutions that serve the broader public on crime prevention.

CBSI'S DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS

The development hypothesis for USAID under CBSI is as follows:

If there is a holistic approach to youth crime and violence prevention that: (1) addresses the risk and resilience factors faced by youth, families, communities, and societies on one hand, and (2) builds institutional capacity for crime and violence prevention, then this will result in an overall reduction in levels of youth crime, violence and victimization over time in the programming targeted areas.

Underlying this hypothesis is the need to strengthen regional and national cooperation on crime and violence data to identify the risk and resilience factors affecting youth and improve evidence-based policy and program decision-making. Engaging communities, family and youth is essential to identifying risk and resilience factors. Decisions on the types of interventions, which risk and resilience factors to target, which communities to focus on, and what institutions to target must be made in partnership with communities, government, and the private sector if USAID wants to achieve sustainable reductions in youth involvement in crime and violence. The justice sector must provide alternatives like dispute resolution and diversion that reduce the number of youth entering the system and address the unique risk factors of youth offenders within the system. Finally, addressing issues like corruption in the police and justice sector, increasing involvement of non-governmental organizations and local governance in violence prevention, promoting community-oriented policing, and increasing the effectiveness of rule of law institutions to respond to and prosecute crime and violence are critical.

THEORY OF CHANGE

Multiple theories of change support CBSI's overall development hypothesis. In each country's context, the theory of change will be more narrowly defined to allow USAID to achieve measurable levels of change. Missions should consider the following theories of change:

Intermediate Result 1: Youth Crime and Violence Prevented in Targeted Communities

If youth and communities are involved in co-creating programs that reduce risk factors and strengthen resilience among at-risk youth, and have the capacity to collectively design and deliver these programs effectively, then crime and violence in targeted communities will be sustainably reduced.

If there are effective, legitimate, and efficient services in place for resolution of inter and intra-community conflicts such as alternative-dispute resolution, conciliation, and mediation processes, then conflicts will be resolved before they escalate, preventing a cycle of violence.

If interventions that reduce youth involvement in criminality are delivered in high crime communities and target individuals at highest risk of becoming victims and/or perpetrators then youth would be less likely to resort to crime and violence and this cumulative behavior change will reduce overall levels of violence in the target communities.

If youth are given alternatives to incarceration and provided with social and rehabilitative services, then youth that are in conflict with the law will have a better chance of reintegrating productively into their communities and build resilience to reduce levels of recidivism.

If youth are less exposed to gender-based violence, or witness GBV being fully prosecuted and considered socially unacceptable, they will be less likely to consider violence against women acceptable and less likely to commit violence later in life as a result.

Intermediate Result 2: Institutions' Effective Response to Growing Crime and Violence

If better data and analysis are available and decision makers at the regional, national, and community levels have the capacity to use it, then they will be able to make more evidence-based and cost-effective programming decisions and improve the outcomes of youth crime and violence interventions.

If police become more involved in designing and/or leading community-focused violence prevention efforts then youth violence prevention programming will have greater legitimacy and public confidence, making it more effective.

If local government and/or civil society become more involved in advocating for, designing, leading, and/or coordinating community-focused violence prevention efforts, then youth violence prevention programming would have greater legitimacy and public confidence, making it more effective.

If mismanagement and inefficiencies in the rule of law sector are reduced, then opportunities for corruption and waste will be reduced, and then levels of impunity will be reduced; crime and violence prosecution will be more legitimate and effective, thereby increasing the criminal justice system's effectiveness as a crime deterrent and resulting in a reduction in the level of crime.

If the justice system effectively prosecutes crime, then impunity will be reduced, increasing the criminal justice system's effectiveness as a crime deterrent, resulting in a reduction in the level of crime.

If alternative-dispute resolution (ADR), conciliation, diversion, and mediation processes are offered as part of the criminal justice system to resolve conflict, then the case backlog in the criminal justice system will be reduced, allowing for a more timely and just resolution of cases and can lead to a reduction in impunity. (Note: In systems where corruption and lack of legitimacy affect the justice system, a focus on ADR can be more effective when partnered with programming that addresses the issues related to corruption and lack of legitimacy)

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS


Intermediate Result 1: Youth Crime and Violence Prevented in Targeted Communities

Intermediate Result (IR) 1 captures the Implementation and MEL Plan's focus on targeting USAID's youth crime and violence prevention programming on: (1) the hot-spot or "opportunity" communities where crime and violence is the highest; and (2) the demographic groups of "opportunity youth" (e.g., youth in detention) that are most at-risk for involvement in crime and violence.

IR 1 includes a broad range of activities that are delineated based on how they target at-risk or opportunity youth. USAID CBSI uses the public health methodology for crime and violence prevention to identify different levels of interventions based on the number of individuals targeted for intervention and those individuals' risk factors. This may be understood using the health impact pyramid developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Director to analyze public health actions. This model, shown in Figure 4, analyzes the spread of disease by looking at broader social and economic factors beyond the health infrastructure. Moving down in the pyramid, interventions are designed to affect increasingly smaller numbers of individuals and the effects of the interventions are more narrowly defined, as they are designed for a select subset of individuals through counseling, training, rehabilitation, and education.³⁹

Figure 1. Applying Public Health Methodology to Violence Prevention: Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Prevention

³⁹ Frieden, Thomas. 2010. "A framework for public health action: the health impact pyramid," American Journal of Public Health, 100(4), p. 590–595.



Source: *Democracy International; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*

Under IR 1, USAID uses definitions derived from the [USAID Crime and Violence Prevention Field Guide](#) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to break down the levels of risk into three levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.

Sub-IR 1.1: Community-level Violence Prevention increases resilience factors and reduces risk factors that drive youth involvement in crime and violence

In the CBSI Results Framework, the first two levels, primary and secondary, are grouped together under the heading of community-level violence prevention. Under both, USAID uses data to identify and target the high crime/violence communities within the country based on the type of violence (e.g. interpersonal, intrapersonal, GBV, *etc.*) targeted, and then works with the community and other stakeholders to identify the appropriate interventions. Interventions can be primary, secondary or both based on what is most appropriate.

- Primary prevention** seeks to prevent violence before it occurs. It may include a range of activities that focus on building community resilience, strengthening social cohesion, addressing gender-based violence, changing societal norms that tolerate violence, and increasing resilience factors that mitigate youth involvement in crime and violence.⁴⁰ Under CBSI, USAID defines primary prevention as efforts that: (1) are available to youth in at-risk communities; (2) identify specific violence problems to target; and/or (3) catalyze community-level actions to prevent crime and violence. Primary prevention targets social drivers of crime and violence, including high poverty and unemployment as well as poor educational attainment; related activities may include the development of community prevention committees, availability of recreational activities for youth, support for workforce development; and work on normative change. Primary prevention programs may also work to improve situational factors such as street lighting, graffiti removal, and the creation of safe recreational spaces for youth and communities.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

- **Secondary prevention** focuses on individuals or groups with several risk factors for becoming victims or perpetrators of crime and violence. In secondary prevention efforts, USAID will more narrowly target at-risk youth, using a risk assessment tool to identify youth with an increased level of risk and deliver specific treatment to reduce risk factors. Ideally, secondary prevention programming will include a way to measure reductions of risk factors.

Secondary interventions reach fewer individuals in a more targeted manner than primary prevention does. Secondary prevention also requires identifying the population(s) at risk and targeting interventions to those segments of the population. One tool that USAID has employed in the Eastern and Southern Caribbean, Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico is the Youth Service Eligibility Tool (YSET), adopted from the experience of addressing gang violence in Los Angeles. The YSET uses survey information to identify at-risk youth and target interventions more strategically to these individuals. Other mechanisms include identifying students who are failing or are frequently absent from school to receive specialized attention within the educational environment. Secondary prevention efforts may focus on unemployed youth who have dropped out of school, for instance. Individuals who abuse drugs or alcohol are another common target audience.

Examples of secondary prevention interventions include programs for youth leadership, remedial education, drug and alcohol rehabilitation, workforce readiness and life skills training tailored to this higher risk group, family counseling, anger management, psycho-social counseling, cognitive behavior training/mindfulness, and mentor programs.⁴¹

Sub-IR 1.2.: Child Justice system rehabilitates and re-integrates youth in conflict with the law back into their communities

Meanwhile, the CBSI Results Framework groups tertiary prevention efforts under Child Justice.

- **Tertiary prevention** is targeted to those individuals who have already engaged in criminal or violent behavior and may also include victims of violence. In the Caribbean, tertiary programming is most often targeted at youth that are already in the child justice system. As such, tertiary prevention programming focuses on rehabilitating, and for those in detention, assisting in their reintegration into society. The focus is to target the most at-risk youth, developing intensive programs to reduce risk factors and build resilience.

The purpose of tertiary prevention interventions is to prevent individuals from reoffending or being re-victimized and to reduce recidivism by rehabilitating those who have been prosecuted and incarcerated. Tertiary prevention typically reaches fewer people than either primary or secondary prevention and requires the most specialized rehabilitation and therapeutic services. Tertiary programming often targets the child justice system. It promotes the use of diversion where possible and other alternatives to detention centers; it supports detention centers and diversion programs to provide rehabilitative and support services sufficient to reduce recidivism. This programming can include drug rehabilitation. Finally, it promotes reintegration programs that help youth leaving diversion programs and detention facilities successfully reintegrate into communities. Under tertiary prevention, possible approaches include individual cognitive behavioral therapy, life skills training, and independent income generation strategies.⁴²

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

Although some of the approaches of secondary and tertiary prevention strategies are the same, individuals who qualify for secondary prevention should not be treated alongside those who are eligible for tertiary prevention. Just as in the public health sector, citizens can be “inoculated” against the spread of an epidemic, but once an epidemic breaks out, vulnerable and at-risk populations need to be identified and targeted for treatment. In violence prevention, individuals and community members at the primary and secondary level who are at risk of violence or exposure to violence may require interventions that focus on mitigating the threat of experiencing higher-risk factors for crime and violence. For ill patients, however, the public health sector focuses on curing the illness so they do not contaminate others and can return safely to society. As with violence prevention, individuals at the tertiary level or highest risk of those who have perpetuated and/or been a victim of violence may require an increased dosage of specialized treatment to reduce recidivism and/or victimization in violent acts.

Intermediate Result 2: Institutions’ Effective Response to Growing Crime and Violence

IR 2 captures USAID’s efforts to improve the ability of government and civil society institutions to effectively prevent crime and violence. Issues like access to quality, comparable data are critical to targeting and measuring the effectiveness of programming. Corruption makes governance institutions less able to invest in crime and violence prevention services; it also fosters impunity, which erodes the rule of law and creates space for criminal actors to operate freely. Ineffective rule of law and governance institutions can also undermine prevention efforts. Administrative deficiencies, such as case backlogs, also contribute to impunity. Law enforcement officials that take a *mano dura* approach alienate community members. These issues, both individual and collectively, stand in the way of local and national governments’ support for comprehensive crime and violence prevention programming.

Sub-IR 2.1: Violence Prevention Policy and Programming is Data-Driven

This Sub-IR targets the need for quality, comparable data to enable USAID and our host-country partners to target violence prevention at high-crime communities, monitor the changes in crime and violence over time, and measure the impact of our violence prevention efforts on levels of crime and violence. Under CBSI, one of USAID’s objectives is for regional, national, and local organizations to use data-driven approaches to violence prevention. USAID will partner with various institutions to facilitate an evidence-based approach to decision making that will inform youth crime and violence prevention policy making and programming.

As part of this programming, USAID will support efforts to develop standardized and disaggregated crime data sources to facilitate identification and measurement of risk factors and program outcomes across the region; present analyses of crime and socio-economic data in formats that support understanding and timely application; and influence decision making on youth crime and violence prevention policy and programming based on the available evidence of the prevalence and nature of youth risk and resilience factors.

Sub-IR 2.2: Criminal Justice System effectively prosecutes Crime and Violence

Sub-IR 2.2 recognizes that corruption, poor access to justice, and ineffective systems and institutions undermine the criminal justice system and creates a culture of impunity. Activities under this Sub-IR target specific weaknesses in the rule of law sector that impede effective policing and prosecution of crime and violence. It also promotes equal and inclusive access to

justice.

Whether lack of effective prosecutions specifically or ineffective criminal justice institutions more broadly create significant problems for crime and violence prevention, USAID will pursue programming that ensures: (1) Crime and violence cases are investigated and resolved in an efficient and effective manner; (2) Administrative weaknesses in target institutions are addressed; and/or 3) Capacity of key institutions is strengthened. These efforts can reduce case backlogs and bring a higher-level of professionalism to the criminal justice sector, increasing efficiency and overcoming a culture of impunity.

Where corruption in the police force specifically or broader criminal justice system as it relates to law enforcement and the judiciary is an obstacle, USAID may target specific efforts at the institutions: (1) changing recruitment practices; (2) strengthening strategic planning and budgeting capacity; (3) supporting the adoption of various transparent standardized systems, and/or (4) strengthening internal affairs units and/or related units in the police, judiciary, and/or elsewhere in the criminal justice system that would be responsible for investigating corruption and negative police practices.

USAID may also support justice institutions in modernizing their systems to improve the speed and quality of case resolution, including addressing significant case backlogs and assisting with the prioritization of reducing violent crime and corruption in policy and strategic planning exercises.

Where there is significant concern that unaddressed conflicts escalate and become larger scale violence issues, USAID may support community-level alternative-dispute resolution, conciliation, and mediations processes in an effort to resolve conflicts adjunct to the formal justice system before they escalate into larger scale violence.

Where governments are unwilling to address corruption, poor access to justice, and ineffective systems in the criminal justice system, USAID may support civil society advocacy efforts to raise awareness of corruption in the criminal justice action to increase the demand for more accountable, transparent, and effective criminal justice system in spaces where transnational organized crime may operate.

Where access to justice for key vulnerable groups is an issue, USAID will work to improve the criminal justice system institutions' treatment of vulnerable groups and pursue interventions that expand access to justice for victims of crime and violence.

Sub-IR 2.3: Institutions Advance Crime and Violence Prevention

This Sub-IR focuses on the integral role that local government, police, and/or civil society can play when they become more involved in advocating for, designing, and/or leading community-focused violence prevention efforts. When this happens, youth violence prevention programming will have greater legitimacy and will be more effective.

At the same time, this Sub-IR can capture local government and/or civil society efforts to advocate for and lead efforts to increase accountability in the police and/or criminal justice system. An increase in external accountability creates pressure that can lead to a reduction of corruption levels in the criminal justice system, declining perceptions of insecurity and ineffectiveness, a decrease in the sense of impunity, and strengthening of critical crime and violence prevention

institutions. These types of studies of activities can fall under this sub-IR or sub-IR 2.2.

This sub-IR includes a broad range of possible interventions that range from: (1) efforts to promote more accountable governance in which local governments take an active role in violence prevention; (2) interventions that promote more community-oriented policing; and/or (3) activities to increase civil society participation in violence prevention.

MEASURING CBSI PROGRESS AND IMPACT

CBSI's Implementation and MEL Plan is informed by a significant amount of research on youth crime and violence prevention in the United States and other developed countries, Central and South America, and on a limited number of studies on crime and violence in the Caribbean. To ensure good stewardship of U.S. taxpayer funds, USAID will make significant investments in data, analysis, monitoring, evaluation, and learning to: (1) identify where to focus programming; (2) design interventions that address specific problem(s) identified; (3) measure impact; (4) assess program implementation and promote adaptive management; (5) confirm the most effective methods in crime and violence prevention; and (6) determine how to advance scaling and replication of CBSI interventions.

As part of these efforts, USAID is committed to supporting rigorous evaluation that advances USAID's learning around youth crime, violence and victimization prevention. CBSI-implementing Missions should invest in performance and impact evaluations aimed at assessing validity of hypotheses and assumptions that underlie the CBSI programming. Missions are encouraged to consider a range of methodologies to conduct performance and impact assessments/evaluations, based on cost and conditions for effective implementation. Missions may want to implement a blended approach to monitoring and evaluation. For example, using traditional methods where linear causal and effect relationships are known and can be measured, complex awareness models where diverse factors interact, or cause and effect relationships that cannot be known in advance but emerge retrospectively over time. This approach will allow the project under CBSI to identify and assess the influence of multiple factors present in different target community contexts that result in positive youth outcomes. It also promotes an iterative learning process alongside target communities. The accompanying Monitoring and Evaluation Action Plan provides more detailed information on measuring CBSI theories of change and building an evidence base to better understand overall objectives.